FND in Court: When Uncertainty Becomes Expert Certainty
When Functional Neurological Disorder (FND) enters a courtroom, a clinician's interpretation can determine far more than a diagnostic label. It may influence whether an injury is recognised, whether an accident is considered responsible for disability, whether a claimant's account is considered credible, and what compensation or future care they receive.
In his lecture on medicolegal considerations in FND, neuropsychiatrist Alan Carson offers an unusually revealing account of these questions. A 2026 review, The Medicolegal Implications of Functional Neurological Disorder, by Mahinda Yogarajah, Tiago Teodoro and Niruj Agrawal, explores many of the same issues in the published literature.
Read together, they expose a more serious problem than ordinary diagnostic uncertainty. FND experts can describe clinical interpretations as robust while acknowledging that the signs are not universally specific, the proposed mechanisms do not establish individual causation, and treatment and prognosis remain uncertain. What is inferred can begin to sound like what is known. Once repeated often enough, a clinical interpretation may acquire the authority of an established fact without the evidence ever becoming more conclusive.
The issue is not whether experts occasionally admit uncertainty. It is whether they have become so confident in the framework that they present its unresolved questions as settled clinical knowledgeโand whether the same certainty survives when they must defend the reasoning under legal scrutiny.
When the Audience Changes, Does the Explanation Change?
I grew up as a pastor's kid. As a teenager, I attended interdenominational meetings where my father spoke with pastors from different churches. I remember noticing how his theological positions sometimes shifted depending on whom he was speaking to. The subject had not changed, but the position he presented seemed to accommodate his audience.
That memory returned while listening to Carson. Near the beginning of his lecture, he explains that medicolegal work has made him question causal explanations that might otherwise be offered rather casually in clinical correspondence. Under legal scrutiny, he finds himself asking whether those explanations are actually true.
Reconsidering a claim under scrutiny is exactly what an expert should do. Nor does my fatherโs example establish anything about Carsonโs motives. But it raises an uncomfortable question about standards: if the setting changes how carefully an explanation is examined, was the original confidence warranted? Carson describes greater scrutiny, not a confession that his earlier opinions were false. That distinction matters. So does the fact that a patient may already have been living with the consequences of an explanation offered with less care.
Why should a medical explanation face greater scrutiny when an insurer might have to pay for it than when a patient has to live with it?
Patients bear the consequences long before lawyers become involved. A diagnosis influences treatment, investigations, credibility and the interpretation of everything that follows. When medicolegal work prompts an expert to ask whether a causal account is actually true, that question should not sound like a special requirement reserved for litigation. It is the question the patient needed answered from the beginning.
The Curious Transformation of Unknowns Into Knowns
Medicine has a curious relationship with uncertainty. Sometimes an unknown remains an unknown. Other times, it acquires a diagnostic label, a proposed mechanism and a specialist's signature, and emerges looking remarkably like established knowledge. The paperwork is more impressive. The evidence has not necessarily changed.
Consider the journey: a clinical sign is observed, but it is not exclusive to one condition. The mechanism behind an individual's presentation remains unconfirmed. Its precise cause may be uncertain, and predicting the outcome may be difficult. Yet somewhere between the examination and the final report, the interpretation can acquire a confidence that exceeds what those observations establish. At what point did the unknown become known? Before or after the consultant signed the report?
Of course, clinicians must make decisions without knowing everything. A working diagnosis is not a scandal. The problem is the quiet promotion of a working interpretation into a settled explanation, without clearly identifying which questions remain unanswered. A plausible account is useful; it is not a receipt for proof.
That is why Carson's remarks about medicolegal scrutiny matter. He describes questioning causal explanations that might otherwise be offered casually in routine correspondence. He does not say that those explanations are necessarily false, and legal scrutiny is not a magical truth machine. But if a possible challenge in court prompts a closer look at what is actually known, why did the uncertainty need a lawyer before it received proper attention?
The patient did not suddenly acquire a greater stake in the explanation when a legal claim began. The stakes were there from the first consultation. An expert should not need a courtroom to distinguish observation from inference, or a compelling theory from a demonstrated cause.
A Robust Diagnosis Without Independent Confirmation
The 2026 review describes FND diagnosis as based on clinical inconsistency and incongruence, including findings such as Hoover's sign, tremor entrainment and differences between voluntary and automatic movement. The authors argue that these findings support a robust clinical diagnosis.
But what, precisely, do they establish? Such findings may support a clinical classification without independently identifying its cause. They are not universally exclusive to FND, and their interpretation depends on the circumstances of the examination and the adequacy of the differential diagnosis. The review itself discusses neurological conditions that can complicate assessment, including frontal lobe seizures, stiff person syndrome and dystonia.
Calling a sign positive does not make it pathognomonic. Calling a diagnosis robust does not establish that it was correctly applied to a particular patient.
Recognising a pattern and explaining why it exists are different tasks. An expert who identifies findings compatible with FND must still explain why that interpretation is preferable to competing explanations, what the evidence actually demonstrates and where uncertainty remains. Agreement between clinicians is not independent confirmation of a proposed mechanism.
The 4% Misdiagnosis Rate: What Was Actually Verified?
The review repeats the familiar claim that FND has a misdiagnosis rate of approximately 4%, while suggesting that missed FND diagnoses are considerably more common. As we examined in The Dark Truth Behind FND's 4% Misdiagnosis Rate, the problem is what that statistic is taken to mean.
The widely cited 2005 systematic review by Stone and colleagues examined historical studies of patients diagnosed with conversion symptoms or hysteria. Approximately 4% subsequently received another diagnosis that explained their original presentation. That is a measure of recognised diagnostic revision in the available follow-up studies, not independent verification that the remaining 96% were correctly classified.
A diagnosis can remain unchanged because it was correct, because no alternative was identified, because reassessment was limited, or because a newly discovered neurological condition was classified as comorbid rather than replacing the original diagnosis. Genuine comorbidity is entirely possible. But where a new disease could explain the original presentation, experts must distinguish coexistence from an earlier diagnostic mistake.
Claims that missed FND is more common than incorrectly diagnosed FND also require comparable populations, methods and standards of verification. Otherwise, the figures cannot establish which error is more common, much less which is more consequential. Carson's example of an Alzheimer's diagnosis later reconsidered as FND illustrates the potential harm of diagnostic error, but cannot establish the relative frequency or severity of errors in either direction.
A diagnosis that is rarely overturned is not necessarily a diagnosis that is rarely wrong. Diagnostic stability and independently demonstrated diagnostic accuracy are not the same thing.
Carson also describes medicolegal cases in which diagnoses including encephalitis and diffuse axonal injury were reconsidered in favour of FND. Without the case records, those revisions cannot be judged here. But replacing one diagnosis with another is not itself proof of correction: the replacement deserves exactly the scrutiny applied to the original.
Are We Diagnosing a Disease or Naming a Phenotype?
In The Common Phenotypes Hypothesis, we explored whether some presentations classified as FND might represent recognisable neurological phenotypes arising from different underlying conditions rather than a single distinct disease process.
Medical history offers an instructive parallel. For centuries, physicians diagnosed dropsy: abnormal swelling caused by fluid accumulation. Their observations were real, and the clinical pattern could be recognised confidently. But dropsy did not, by itself, establish whether heart, kidney, liver or another disease was responsible. Naming the presentation was not the same as explaining its cause.
Could some presentations classified as FND pose a similar problem? Positive signs may identify a recognisable pattern without establishing the biological processes producing it. A subsequently discovered disease may therefore be more than an incidental comorbidity; it may explain findings previously attributed to FND.
The distinction matters acutely in medicolegal practice. Recognising a clinical pattern is one task. Establishing that an accident caused it, that another neurological disease did not cause it, or that a proposed predictive-processing mechanism explains an individual's disability is another. Confidence in the first conclusion does not automatically justify confidence in the others.
History should make us cautious about the authority of prevailing explanations. Physicians have repeatedly classified presentations confidently, only for later discoveries to reveal that their understanding was incomplete. The Common Phenotypes Hypothesis does not establish that FND is merely a collection of presentations with different causes. It asks whether we are sometimes mistaking recognition for explanation.
Medical history does not prove that today's FND experts are wrong. It shows why their confidence, by itself, cannot establish that they are right. When that confidence is used to overturn diagnoses or determine compensation, the distinction is no longer merely philosophical.
A Causal Framework That Can Accommodate Almost Anything
One of the most revealing parts of the 2026 review is its table of predisposing, precipitating and perpetuating factors. The list encompasses childhood adversity, minor and major injuries, anxiety, depression, chronic pain, neurodevelopmental conditions, poor medical care, litigation, diagnostic uncertainty and changes in behaviour. The review also includes lack of acceptance of an FND diagnosis, repeated investigations and reliance on aids or care among possible perpetuating factors.
Some proposed factors have evidence of association; others are hypotheses about mechanisms or influences. The difficulty begins when a broad list is used retrospectively to explain a particular person's disability. An injury may be described as a trigger whether minor or severe. Adversity may be relevant when present, without being necessary when absent. Continued investigation, disagreement and a sense of injustice may all be folded into the account of why symptoms persist.
What, then, would count as evidence against the proposed explanation? A framework flexible enough to accommodate many different histories is not automatically false. But flexibility increases the need to demonstrate why a factor is causally relevant in this patient, rather than merely available as a plausible item on a list.
A risk factor is not an individual causal finding. A proposed mechanism is not a demonstrated mechanism. And a retrospective story does not become proof because it has been organised into medical terminology.
When Questioning the Diagnosis Becomes Part of the Explanation
This connects directly to The Belief Prerequisite: How FND Treatment Echoes Faith Healing, where I examined the emphasis placed on accepting an FND diagnosis. Growing up around religious healing taught me how powerful belief, expectation and reinforcement can be. I described a woman who believed she had been healed, stopped necessary treatment and continued walking despite serious disease. Her condition later deteriorated, and she underwent amputations. The account illustrated the danger of allowing commitment to an explanation to override recognition of deterioration; it was not evidence that faith healing and FND treatment are equivalent.
The 2026 review makes that concern especially relevant. It explicitly lists lack of acceptance of the diagnosis, ongoing diagnostic uncertainty and repeated investigations among possible perpetuating factors. A patient who questions the diagnosis or requests further investigation may therefore find those responses incorporated into an explanation for why their disability persists.
How is a patient supposed to challenge an incorrect diagnosis when challenging the diagnosis can itself be interpreted as part of the problem?
Finding an association between diagnostic acceptance and better outcomes does not establish that disagreement causes symptoms to persist. A patient may reject a diagnosis because it was poorly explained, because treatment failed, because new evidence emerged or because the diagnosis was wrong. That last possibility cannot be treated as an inconvenience to the therapeutic narrative.
In litigation, the implications are more serious still. A claimant's disagreement, continued investigations or sense of injustice could influence an expert's account of persistent disability. Such interpretations require evidence, not assumptions about the patient's attitude.
If accepting the diagnosis is considered therapeutic while questioning it is considered perpetuating, the framework risks rewarding agreement and pathologising disagreement. That is not diagnostic validation.
Inconsistency Is Not Proof of Deception
Carson and the 2026 review discuss discrepancies between reported disability and observed function. The review acknowledges that no test can confidently identify every instance of intentionally produced symptoms, that performance validity test failures occur in several neurological conditions, and that signs such as Hoover's sign and tremor entrainment cannot independently distinguish FND from deliberate feigning.
Surveillance and observed discrepancies may be relevant evidence, but their meaning depends on the patient's actual claims and the circumstances of observation. Performing an activity once does not necessarily establish the capacity to repeat it consistently, safely or without consequences. Conversely, clear and repeated contradictions between specific claims and observations deserve examination. Neither conclusion should be assumed in advance.
Carson acknowledges the lack of research into potential harms from covert surveillance. The review itself lists perceived attacks on integrity, including surveillance, among possible perpetuating factors. A system that scrutinises a patient's credibility must be equally willing to scrutinise the reliability and consequences of its own methods.
Treatment Evidence Does Not Justify Blind Optimism
The review cites long-term follow-up evidence in which approximately 80% of patients with functional limb weakness still experienced weakness after an average of 14 years. It also acknowledges the difficulty of predicting individual outcomes and the limitations of commonly proposed prognostic factors.
Two major randomised trials sharpen the concern. In Physio4FMD, specialist physiotherapy did not demonstrate a statistically significant advantage over treatment as usual on the primary physical-functioning outcome at 12 months, although some secondary outcomes favoured the intervention. In CODES, cognitive behavioural therapy plus standardised medical care did not significantly reduce monthly dissociative seizure frequency on the primary outcome compared with standardised care alone, although some secondary outcomes improved.
These findings do not show that all treatment is ineffective. They do limit what can responsibly be promised. A favourable secondary outcome cannot be presented as though a trial met its primary endpoint, and the possibility of improvement is not evidence that a particular claimant will recover enough to need less support.
That uncertainty also has financial consequences. If a settlement assumes successful rehabilitation and recovery does not follow, the claimant may bear the shortfall. The review discusses concerns that excessive care or reliance on aids might reinforce disability while also recognising that some patients require substantial long-term support. Those decisions demand patient-specific evidence: what makes an aid excessive, what demonstrates that it impedes recovery, and how reliably can future independence be predicted?
A theoretical possibility of recovery is not demonstrated functional capacity. Patients cannot meet their daily care needs using an expert's optimism.
What Would Actually Prove the Diagnosis Wrong?
In Is FND Falsifiable?, we examined the diagnostic framework through Karl Popper's principle of falsifiability. The question was straightforward: what evidence would demonstrate that an FND diagnosis was incorrect?
That question has practical force in a courtroom. If diagnostic signs are not universally specific, a later neurological diagnosis can be treated as comorbid, and disagreement or repeated investigation can be interpreted as perpetuating factors, the expert should be able to explain what would lead them to abandon the original interpretation.
This is where our earlier articles converge. Post #25 asks whether diagnostic errors are reliably detected. Post #68 questions the consequences of making acceptance central to recovery. Post #77 asks whether a recognised phenotype is being mistaken for its cause. Together with the question of falsifiability, they expose a problem of diagnostic accountability.
A diagnosis does not need a unique biomarker to be clinically useful. But it must remain open to correction. Experts should be able to identify what alternative findings would change their opinion, how they distinguish genuine comorbidity from misdiagnosis, and why contradictory evidence has or has not altered their conclusion.
If every contradictory finding can be accommodated, every newly discovered disease can remain a comorbidity and every objection can become a perpetuating factor, the diagnosis risks becoming resistant to correction. That is unacceptable when an expert opinion can reshape someone's medical and financial future.
When Uncertainty Meets Authority
The 2026 review calls for transparent, balanced opinions that distinguish established evidence from uncertainty. But a declaration of uncertainty is not a safeguard if the conclusion proceeds as though the uncertainty has already been resolved. This is where the distinction between observing a clinical pattern, inferring its cause and proving a particular explanation becomes decisive.
The literature acknowledges that clinical signs require interpretation, alternative diseases must be considered, individual causation can be difficult to establish, proposed mechanisms are not necessarily demonstrated in a particular patient, symptom authenticity cannot be reliably inferred from a single sign, major treatment trials have missed important primary endpoints, and long-term outcomes are difficult to predict.
Yet an expert may still be asked to decide whether a previous neurological diagnosis should be replaced, whether an accident caused disability, how much weight to place on reported limitations and what support someone will need for years to come. Courts must often decide cases on incomplete evidence. But the need for a decision does not create scientific certainty, and professional authority does not eliminate evidentiary limitations.
Experts cannot convert an inference into a fact through repetition, consensus or professional confidence. If they cannot establish an individual mechanism, exclude a plausible competing explanation or predict recovery reliably, their opinions must say so plainlyโand the strength of their conclusions must change accordingly.
If a diagnosis is difficult to independently verify, newly discovered diseases can be classified as comorbidities, and disagreement can be interpreted as perpetuating the condition, what safeguards ensure that an incorrect FND diagnosis will actually be recognised and corrected?
Carsonโs opening observation brings us back to the central question: why should the standard of scrutiny depend on the audience? If a causal account needs qualification under legal challenge, it needed that qualification when it was first given to the patient. The courtroom does not create the uncertainty. It merely makes the cost of overlooking it harder to ignore.
Unknowns do not become knowns because an expert believes in the framework, because colleagues agree, or because the explanation sounds convincing in a report. If the evidence supports a probability, call it a probability. If the cause remains uncertain, say so. The standard should not change when the patient leaves the consulting room and the lawyers arrive.
The patient had everything at stake long before the lawyers arrived.
References
- Carson A. Medicolegal Considerations in Functional Neurological Disorders. British Neuropsychiatry Association lecture, 2022.
- Yogarajah M, Teodoro T, Agrawal N. The Medicolegal Implications of Functional Neurological Disorder. Seminars in Neurology. 2026;46(2):225โ233.
- Stone J et al. Systematic review of misdiagnosis of conversion symptoms and hysteria. BMJ. 2005.
- Functional neurological disorder and multiple sclerosis: a systematic review of misdiagnosis and clinical overlap. 2022.
- Diagnosis and management of functional neurological disorder. BMJ. 2022.
- Cautionary notes on diagnosing functional neurologic disorder as a neurologist-in-training. 2021.
- McWhirter L et al. Performance validity test failure in clinical populations: a systematic review. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry.
- Gelauff JM et al. The prognosis of functional limb weakness: a 14-year case-control study. Brain. 2019.
- Nielsen G et al. Specialist physiotherapy for functional motor disorder (Physio4FMD). Lancet Neurology. 2024.
- Goldstein LH et al. Cognitive behavioural therapy for adults with dissociative seizures (CODES). Lancet Psychiatry. 2020.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica. Dropsy. Historical context for the phenotype analogy.
- FND Nope. The Dark Truth Behind FND's 4% Misdiagnosis Rate.
- FND Nope. Is FND Falsifiable?
- FND Nope. The Belief Prerequisite: How FND Treatment Echoes Faith Healing.
- FND Nope. The Common Phenotypes Hypothesis.