An FND Diagnosis Does Not Mean They Know What Is Wrong

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One frequently repeated claim about Functional Neurological Disorder (FND) is that receiving the diagnosis does not mean the clinician does not know what is wrong. The justification is that FND is a positive, rule-in diagnosis based on identifiable clinical signs rather than merely the absence of another explanation.

But this argument conflates two fundamentally different things: knowing how to classify a patient's symptoms and knowing what is actually causing them. A neurologist may identify Hoover's sign, distractibility, entrainment or another recognised clinical feature. These observations can support a diagnostic classification, but they do not, by themselves, establish the underlying cause of the patient's illness. Recognising a pattern is not the same as explaining its origin.

#MustBeTheFND - A Label, Not an Explanation
Medical Constructivism Versus Realism

As previously discussed in FND: Philosophy Masquerading as Diagnosis, the distinction becomes clearer when viewed through medical constructivism and philosophical realism. Medicine can construct diagnostic categories, establish criteria and reach professional consensus about which observations belong under a particular label. These classifications may be clinically useful, but their existence does not establish that the underlying biological explanation is correct.

Philosophical realism starts from a different premise: reality exists independently of our descriptions of it. Whatever is producing a patient's symptoms exists regardless of whether medicine has identified it, classified it correctly or agreed upon a name. A diagnostic label cannot resolve uncertainty simply because clinicians have established criteria for applying it. This does not mean every diagnosis requires complete knowledge of its mechanism, but it does mean that classification must not be misrepresented as causal understanding.


What Do They Actually Know?

The distinction is straightforward. A clinician may know that certain examination findings are present. They may conclude that those findings satisfy the diagnostic criteria for FND. They may even have reasonable confidence in that classification. But if they cannot establish why those findings occur, or what is actually producing the patient's illness, then that uncertainty remains. The claim that FND is a positive diagnosis does not eliminate it.

This is precisely the epistemological problem explored in How Can a Layman Determine Whether a Medical Diagnosis Is Legitimate?. Defining something is not the same as demonstrating it. Clinical signs are evidence to be interpreted, not explanations that establish their own causes. Their diagnostic value must also be independently demonstrated against relevant competing conditions.

The problem is not that medicine uses diagnostic categories despite incomplete knowledge. It does so routinely. The problem arises when clinicians communicate greater certainty than their evidence justifies, particularly when that certainty discourages further investigation or causes subsequent findings to be interpreted through an existing label.


Calling It FND Does Not Resolve the Unknown

If a clinician says, "We know your symptoms fit the diagnostic criteria for FND," that is a claim about classification. If they say, "We know what is wrong with you," they may be making a substantially stronger claim. The two should not be treated as interchangeable. Where the underlying cause remains unknown, intellectual honesty requires acknowledging that uncertainty rather than obscuring it behind diagnostic terminology.

Ultimately, the question is not whether clinicians know what to call the patient's presentation. It is whether they know what is actually wrong. If they have not established that, then they do not know, no matter how confidently the diagnosis is presented.


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