Functional Cognitive Disorder: When Remembering That You Forgot Becomes a Diagnostic Clue
Forgetting why you entered a room, losing track of a conversation, struggling to remember a name or suddenly being unable to recall a familiar number are ordinary human experiences. They are also among the symptoms described in the June 2020 NeuroSymptoms guidance on functional cognitive disorder (FCD), authored by Biba Stanton, Laura McWhirter, Alan Carson and Jon Stone. The guidance explains these difficulties as changes in brain functioning rather than disease or damage and tells patients that a confident diagnosis is possible.
The difficulty lies in establishing that distinction. The accompanying 12-page factsheet acknowledges that the listed symptoms are common in healthy people, that patients classified as having FCD may perform normally or poorly on cognitive tests, and that pain, medication, sleep disturbance and other physical problems can interfere with attention. Yet the document proceeds to explain how patients should understand their symptoms through a functional framework. The unresolved question is how reliably the clinical observations distinguish a functional cause from the numerous other explanations capable of producing similar difficulties.
This problem was already explored by FND Nope contributor Jakov in his article The FND quacks think that bringing a list of written notes to your appointment is near-certain proof that you have a psychosomatic disorder. Jakov investigated research treating an organised written symptom list as a diagnostic indicator of FCD. Read alongside the NeuroSymptoms factsheet, his investigation exposes a wider problem: ordinary behaviours, including remembering and describing one's own memory failures, can acquire diagnostic significance without independently establishing their cause.
Remembering That You Forgot
One of the most revealing passages appears on page eight of the NeuroSymptoms factsheet. Under advice about changing automatic thoughts, the document presents a patient worried that worsening memory problems indicate dementia. The suggested replacement thought states that people with dementia generally notice their difficulties less than others do, and that being particularly aware of memory problems makes dementia less likely.
There is a legitimate clinical observation behind this advice: impaired awareness of cognitive deficits can occur in dementia, and the relationship between subjective complaints and objective impairment may provide useful diagnostic information. But awareness is neither absent in every person with dementia nor exclusive to functional cognitive presentations. People with early neurodegenerative disease may recognise and describe their difficulties, while people with numerous other medical conditions may experience intermittent cognitive impairment without losing the ability to recognise it.
The same reasoning appears in the research literature. A 2024 international Delphi study lists the ability to describe several memory failures clearly among features observed in FCD, alongside forgetting familiar information but recalling it later. These observations may help characterise a clinical presentation, but they cannot independently identify its cause. A person can remember an episode of forgetting without that episode being functional, just as someone can recover a temporarily inaccessible memory without demonstrating a functional neurological disorder.
Consider hypoglycaemia. When blood glucose falls sufficiently, a person may become confused, struggle to concentrate, forget familiar information or have difficulty following a conversation. Once glucose levels recover, their cognitive performance may improve, and they may be able to describe precisely what happened. The symptoms were variable, the impairment was temporary, and the patient may retain awareness of the episode. None of that makes hypoglycaemia functional. It demonstrates why the timing of symptoms, physiological circumstances and objective evidence matter more than an isolated observation of inconsistency or preserved insight.
The point is not that hypoglycaemia resembles FCD in every respect, or that a properly assessed metabolic disturbance would meet FCD diagnostic criteria. It is that temporary cognitive impairment and subsequent recovery are not uniquely functional phenomena. The proposed FCD criteria themselves require that symptoms are not better explained by another medical or psychiatric condition. Recognising variability is therefore only the beginning of clinical reasoning, not its conclusion.
When Bringing Notes Becomes a Positive Sign
Jakov's earlier investigation examined an equally revealing example. In 2023, Cabreira and colleagues published Clinical signs in functional cognitive disorders: A systematic review and diagnostic meta-analysis, reviewing 30 studies involving 8,602 participants. Among the characteristics examined was bringing an organised written list of symptoms to a medical consultation. The review identified this behaviour as highly specific but poorly sensitive for FCD within the studied comparison groups.
The analysis drew on two studies involving 258 patients. Its summary estimates reported specificity of approximately 98% for the written-list observation, although the sign was rarely present. Such a figure sounds impressive, but it does not mean that someone arriving with written notes has a 98% probability of FCD. Specificity describes how often a sign is absent among people in the comparison group. It depends on the populations studied, how diagnoses were assigned and whether the results generalise to other patients.
The review itself acknowledged important limitations, including that education, personality characteristics, monitoring behaviour and even early neurodegeneration might influence whether a patient brings notes. These qualifications are particularly important because there are numerous ordinary reasons to prepare for an appointment. Patients with complicated histories may need to explain previous investigations, medication reactions, changing symptoms or unanswered questions within a limited consultation. Someone experiencing memory difficulties may have an even stronger reason to write things down.
Jakov described precisely this situation. Preparing notes had long been part of his academic and professional life, and he considered it sensible to do the same when seeking medical help. He reported receiving an FND diagnosis in which bringing written notes played a role, before subsequently receiving diagnoses of Long Covid and myalgic encephalomyelitis. His experience is not a diagnostic accuracy study, but it illustrates the danger of interpreting an ordinary behaviour without adequately considering the patient's history and circumstances.
The Circularity Behind the Evidence
Jakov identified a more fundamental methodological problem in the underlying research. In La maladie du petit papier: A sign of functional cognitive disorder?, Randall and Larner used a pragmatic FCD classification for patients without evidence of dementia, mild cognitive impairment or another underlying cognitive disorder. The presence of written notes was then examined against these classifications.
This raises an obvious question: if patients are classified as having FCD because recognised alternative cognitive disorders have not been established, what exactly does a subsequent association with written notes prove? It may demonstrate that the behaviour differs between patients with established cognitive impairment and those without it. It does not necessarily demonstrate that written notes identify a distinct functional mechanism.
Indeed, an earlier 2018 analysis of non-canonical cognitive signs discussed the written-list observation as a possible indicator of cognitive normality, reporting high specificity but very low sensitivity. The distinction matters. A sign that helps distinguish patients without measurable cognitive impairment from those with established impairment does not automatically become a positive diagnostic sign of FCD. Absence of evidence for one disorder is not positive evidence for a particular alternative.
This is the circularity problem Jakov highlighted. A diagnostic group can be assembled through pragmatic clinical classification, distinctive behaviours identified within that group, and those behaviours subsequently presented as evidence supporting the classification. Without independent validation, the process risks confirming the original grouping rather than establishing that it represents a reliably distinguishable disorder.
Ordinary Forgetfulness and the Problem of Interpretation
The NeuroSymptoms factsheet itself supplies evidence that common memory lapses have limited diagnostic value. On page seven, it reports a survey of 127 healthy young adults in which 57% experienced word-finding difficulties at least weekly, 51% forgot why they entered a room, 35% forgot an important conversation, appointment or errand, and 28% forgot an important PIN or telephone number. These figures are presented as reassurance that forgetting is normal, but they also demonstrate why such experiences cannot independently establish a functional diagnosis.
The factsheet additionally suggests that excessive note-taking, monitoring memory performance and reliance on reminders may consume attention and contribute to cognitive difficulties. This is a proposed maintaining mechanism, not proof of the original cause. It is also distinct from the research on bringing written notes to a consultation: the factsheet does not explicitly identify arriving with notes as a diagnostic sign. Nevertheless, both discussions illustrate how ordinary behaviours can be interpreted within the same framework of attentional dysfunction and heightened concern about memory.
The resulting diagnostic picture can become difficult to challenge. Forgetting familiar information may be described as a functional cognitive symptom. Remembering and explaining the forgetting may be interpreted as preserved insight favouring FCD. Preparing written notes may also be considered a characteristic clinical sign. Each observation may have some statistical association within particular populations, but none establishes a functional mechanism merely by being present. The clinical interpretation must remain open to competing explanations rather than treating every observation as confirmation.
What the Research Actually Establishes
Modern FCD research increasingly emphasises internal inconsistency: differences between reported difficulties and observed performance, or between performance under different circumstances. Such observations may be clinically useful, but inconsistency describes a pattern rather than identifying its cause. Sleep disturbance, pain, fatigue, medication effects, metabolic abnormalities and neurological disease can influence cognitive performance. The relevant question is whether the observed inconsistency has been shown to distinguish FCD from those alternatives in a patient with the same clinical circumstances.
The research literature acknowledges that this remains an area of development. The 2024 Delphi study stated that proposed FCD criteria had not been externally validated and that inter-rater reliability for positive features had not been established. A 2025 pilot study subsequently reported promising performance for a diagnostic checklist, while calling for prospective, blinded validation in larger and more diverse populations. These developments are relevant, but discrimination between existing clinical groups is not identical to independently demonstrating the underlying cause of symptoms.
The distinction also matters for treatment. The NeuroSymptoms factsheet recommends improving sleep, reviewing medication, managing pain, adjusting activity and challenging unhelpful beliefs about memory. These approaches may benefit patients for several reasons unrelated to FCD. The authors acknowledge that evidence for the most effective FCD-specific treatment remains limited and describe cognitive behavioural therapy as a possible intervention requiring further investigation. Improvement following general symptom-management advice cannot retrospectively establish that a functional diagnosis was correct.
The concern is not that clinicians should ignore memory complaints, behavioural observations or differences between subjective and objective performance. It is that those observations must be interpreted according to their demonstrated diagnostic value, with appropriate consideration of alternative causes. A patient who remembers forgetting, arrives with detailed notes or performs better under different circumstances has supplied clinical information. They have not thereby demonstrated a functional neurological mechanism.
Jakov's investigation exposed the weakness of elevating an organised symptom list into a highly specific diagnostic indicator. The NeuroSymptoms factsheet reveals the broader interpretive framework in which awareness of forgetting, ordinary memory lapses and attentional variability are given functional explanations. Together, they illustrate why diagnostic confidence cannot substitute for independent evidence that the features being observed reliably distinguish the proposed condition from its alternatives.
When someone experiences confusion during a documented blood-glucose drop and subsequently remembers the episode, the physiological explanation matters. When someone prepares notes for a complicated medical appointment, the reason for doing so matters. When someone recognises that their memory is deteriorating, the clinical course and objective findings matter. A diagnostic framework that overlooks these distinctions risks mistaking the description of a symptom for an explanation of its cause.
Remembering that you forgot is not proof of a functional disorder. Neither is writing it down. If these observations are to contribute to a confident diagnosis, their diagnostic significance must be demonstrated independently, against relevant competing conditions, rather than inferred from patients who have already been classified as having FCD.
References
- NeuroSymptoms. Functional Cognitive Symptoms and Functional Cognitive Disorder. Patient guidance and information sheet, June 2020.
- Jakov. The FND quacks think that bringing a list of written notes to your appointment is near-certain proof that you have a psychosomatic disorder. FND Nope, 22 April 2026.
- Randall A, Larner AJ. La maladie du petit papier: A sign of functional cognitive disorder? International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry. 2018.
- Bharambe V, Larner AJ. Functional cognitive disorders: demographic and clinical features contribute to a positive diagnosis. Neurodegenerative Disease Management. 2018.
- Larner AJ. Number Needed to Diagnose, Predict, or Misdiagnose: Useful Metrics for Non-Canonical Signs of Cognitive Status? Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders Extra. 2018.
- McWhirter L, Ritchie C, Stone J, Carson A. Functional cognitive disorders: a systematic review. The Lancet Psychiatry. 2020;7:191โ207.
- Cabreira V et al. Clinical signs in functional cognitive disorders: A systematic review and diagnostic meta-analysis. Journal of Psychosomatic Research. 2023;173:111447.
- Perspectives on the diagnosis and management of functional cognitive disorder: An international Delphi study. European Journal of Neurology. 2024.
- Cabreira V et al. Development of a diagnostic checklist to identify functional cognitive disorder versus other neurocognitive disorders. BMJ Neurology Open. 2025;7:e000918.